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STATENENT OF SENA'roR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

A T!ITRD HAY ON BERLIN

THU JUN 15 1961 AM
Mr. Presi dent:
As anticipated by the President, the talks in Vienna did not
produce any significant change in the situation at Berlin .

Strip the

newspaper accounts of their sensationalism and one thing is clear:
situation in Berlin is where it was in the fall of 1958.

The

It is unchanged

despite the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1959.

It is un-

changed despite the friendly meeting at Camp David in 1959 and the furious
meeting in Paris in the aftermath of the U-2 incident .

There were no

spirits at Vienna, only the hard facts exchanged without embellishment .
There was only a high degree of soberness coupled with the personal
courtesy of leaders, without which nations cannot hope to find a way to
peace, today, any better than when diplomacy first began .
In this sense the Vienna
chaff.

t~lks

were useful .

They swept away the

They revealed to both Mr. Khrushchev and Mr . Kennedy the hard kernel

of the problem.

They revealed, too, that the problem confronts us in sub-

stantially the same form as it did when it first appeared more than two
years ago .
I suppose, Mr . President, we may regard the fact that the situation in Berlin is unchanged after two years, that the crisis has been postponed for two years, as some sort of achievement.

In early 1959, a military

showdown appeared imminent to me, as it did to most observers, unless the
poli c i es and attitudes of a decade and a half would begin to change.
showdown did not take place.

The

It was forestalled by an almost continuous
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round of sub-summit and summit conferences and visitings back and forth
and hither and yon.
the past two years

The crisis has stirred again from time to time during
bu~

mean that it will not.

it has not erupted.

Because it has not does not

If the present positions of the parties concerned

remain unchanged, sooner or later, this crisis postponed, this crisis
avoided will cease to lie dormant.
~fuat

is involved at Berlin is not some obscure situation, distant

from our concern or the concern of the Soviet Union.
of these concerns.

Berlin is at the core

Berlin is the lever which may ease Europe towards a more

durable security or push the Western nations and the Soviet Union into a new
vortex of irrationality at whose center lies the graveyard of humanity.
In these circumstances, we owe it to ourselves to examine the
position which we have assumed with respect to Berlin.
Soviet Union are obligated to do the same.
of the world.

The leaders of the

Both sides owe it to the people

The responsibility which we have, Mr. President, and which

the Soviet Union has, is not merely to reassert positions already assumed
and which are obviously irreconcilable.

The responsibility is to seek to

determine whether or not there is a third way on Berlin which corresponds
more accurately to the needs of Germany today, Europe today and the world
today--indeed, a

thi~d

way which meets more fully the contemporary needs

of both the Soviet Union and ourselves.
vle can make this exploration only if we see clearly what the

present positions are and what they imply.
Together with Britain and France this nation is pledged to maintain an allied presence in vlest Berlin and to defend the people of that
half-city.

The other members of N.A.T.O. have endorsed this position.
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I do not think there is any misunderstanding of what we are
pledged to do, either at. home or abroad.

Nevertheless, let us restate

the position to be certain that it is not misunderstood either at home
or abroad.

Let us restate it without provocation, without bombast.

Let

us restate it, as I am sure the President did at Vienna, in all soberness:
\-le ,.,ill not be driven, pushed or barred from fulfilling our responsibilities to ourselves and to freedom in Berlin by any nation, half-nation,
S[OUP of nations or whatever.

Such measures as may be necessary to assert

that responsibility will be taken.
This is what we say in the phrase:

Stand firm at Berlin.

The

full implications of these four words had better be understood in this
Senate, in this Congress and throughout the nation.
understood now.

They had better be

The range of this commitment extends from a 'beginning of

words of firmness, to a midpoint of expenditure of immense resources and
enormous taxes and other sacrificeG, to a final pledge of the lives and
fortunes of every man, woman and child in the nation.

We are not engaged

at Berlin with the fast draw and wax bullets of television anymore than
the Russians are engaged in a harmless game of chess.

In the last analysis

we are engaged now, as we have been at Berlin, with the whole future of the
United States.

In this day and age and in this situation, the words, stand-

ing nrm, carry no other than this ultj_mate implication.
I say this, Mr. President, with no desire to disturb the serenity
of the Senate.
words we use.

I say it only that we may be clear on the meaning of the
I say it in order that we may comprehend more accurately

the immense burden which rests on the shoulders of the President of the
United States.

He will make the decisions and he must make them in this

- 4 -

awesome context.

I trust and I am confident that those of us with public

responsibilities--in government and out and particularly the press and
other news media--will remain cognizant of this burden during the next
few months.
Let me set forth next, Mr. President, my understanding of the
position to which the Soviet Union adheres in the Berlin situation.

It

is, so far as I am aware, unchanged as is ours, except in time-schedule
since it was first announced in November 1958.
that position in substance, without

I should like to state

se~sationalism

and as objectively as

I can delineate it from the accounts which have appeared in the press.
The Soviet Union intends to withdraw from its vlorld War II occupational
re8ponsibilities in East Berlin and it insists that the Western powers
must do the same in vleet Berlin.

It proposes to turn over East Berlin

to the East German authorities, presumably as part of a separate peace
treaty with the East German government.

It offers to join in a guarantee

of a new status for West Berlin as a free city within that state.

And if

I am not mistaken, Mr. ICarushchev has added to this position a further
contention that the Soviet Union will come to the military aid of the East
German authorities in the event that the Western powers refuse to accept
this change and continue to assert their present responsibilities in West
Berlin in opposition to the ''lishes of those authorities.
These two positions, then, form the substance of the Berlin
crisis now dormant but which, at any time, may become active.

We insist,

in effect, on the continuance of the status quo in Berlin for the present
and, presumably until such time as Germany is unified.

The Russians are
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intent upon changing the status quo in a particular fashion in the near
futu~e,

regardless of the eventual solution of the question of German uni-

fication.
I know that we intend to mai.ntain our position .

I do not lightly

assume that the Soviet Premier does not mean what he says with respect to
the position of the Soviet Union, despite the postponements of the actual
act of Soviet withdrawal during the months and years since November 1959.

My own view of this situation, however, is not one which depends
on whether the Soviet Premier means what he says or does not mean what he
says.

It is based upon my personal estimate of the changing situation in

Europe and. the 1.;orld and it is based upon what I believe to be the rational
interests of this nation in the light of those changes,
I have long questioned and I continue to question a status quo
which places us in the position, in effect, of pleading with or urging
the Russians not to withdraw their military forces from the Westernmost
point of penetration which they reached in Europe in the wake

of World

War II; yet, our present position on Berlin requires that we do precisely
that.

Further, Mr. PTesident, I do not think we can safeguard most ef-

fectively our o·..m interests or advance the interests of peace when we
insist upon remaining directly under a communist sword of Damocles, as
is now the case in Berlin, if a rational alternative may be found to that
position through diplomacy.

Further, Mr. President, I have long questioned

and I continue to question a position on Berlin which was assumed immediately
after World War II and has been maintained unchanged despite the enormous
changes which have occurred in both parts of Germany and in Europe since
that time.

Finally, I question, as I have long questioned, a position
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which, through subordinate irresponsibility, error or provocation on either
side invites the precipitation of a nuclear conflict.
We prove our courage. our steadfastness, our determination when
we insist, as insist we must with all that insistance implies, that we
shall not

p~.:: mi t

the Russians or anyone else to dictate unilaterally the

terms under which this nation and

i~s

allies shall discharge the responsi-

bilities which were assumed in Berlin in the wake of vTorld War II.
~ould

We

prove li-ttle more than the inertia of Western leadership, however,

if we insist that the status quo in Berlin is sacronsanct.

We prove little

more than the sterility of our diplomacy if we insist that the status quo
at BerUn cannot be <:_banged even by mutual agreement leading to a new
sj_tuation, which is neither that which nm• exists nor the alternative
which the Soviet Union propou.r..ds.

It seems

to~Mr.

President, that if

w;e are to be not merely courageous but iutelligently courageous that is

precisely the course we must pursue ,

We must seek a third way in Berlin

which may better serve the j.nterests of all the parties concerneC.--of the
German people no less than other

Eurc:..,~uns,

of the Uni tee. States no less

than the Soviet U':lion and of that great stretch of the -vmrld with its
hundreds of millions of people to whom Berlin is but a name if it is even
that.
I would not vrish to preclude, Mr. President, any proposals to
this end which may originate in any quarter.

Indeed, it would be helpful,

in my opinion, if the Senate discussed this matter at length.

I suggest,

moreover, that this discussion might profitably begin now before the
relatively dormant crisis in Berlin ccmes alive once again.

We can think

now of its many implications with a measure of detachment and deliberation.
If we wait for the moment of

h~at,

it may be too late to think at all.

- 7I repeat, Mr. President, I do not wish to preclude any ideas or
proposals, regardless of their source, which may promise a rational solution of the problem of Berlin.

For my part, however, I believe that the

third way lies in an honest recognition of the fact that it is too late in
the ge.me to expect that Germany will be reunified in peace by fiat of the
United States, France, Great Britain and Soviet Russia as was expected 15
years ago.

Yet, this assumption continues to underlie our position with

respect to Berlin.

If the assumption is invalid, then the continued

garrisoning of Berlin by the forces of these four nations loses much of
its significance as a temporary occupational measure
intended to be when these garrisons

~rere

~mich

was

~11

it was

established a decade and a half

ago.
However, Berlin--not just West Berlin but all Berlin--d.oes not
lose its significance in terms of ultimate German
remains the symbolic hope of that

un~fication

unif~cation.

Ber~in

and I do not think it is

unreasonable to assume that it will one day again be the actual capital
of a unified Germany.
the best

opportu~ity

It seems to me that the German people will have
to find the way to unification in peace and the out-

side powers will make a significant contribution to the search, if they
will act now to

r~move

Berlin--all Berlin--from the clashes of the cold

war into which it has baen driven by the events of the post-war years.
If we must live, as it now seems likely, for an indefinite period 1v.Lth
a divided Germany, then, peace requi:-es that Berlin--all Berlin--be held
in peace and in trust until the day of unification.

Its status must be

reconstituted so that Berlin wj_ll be the hope for peaceful German unification rather than the prize for German unification by
has now become .

ot~er

means which it
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This conversion of Berlin will not occur under Mr. Khrushchev's
proposal to turn only Hest Be:::-Hn into a free city.

Even if the rights

of the Western ;preBence to that half-city were insu-red beyond a shaa.ow
of doubt, even if gue.rantees of the safety of the vlestern enclave were
inviolata, it
factory.

~oes

not

s~em

to me that this arrangement would be satis-

For it would reduce this enclave to a sleepy quasi-foreign

anachronism au_?. it would leave Berlin--symbolic Berlin, unifying Berlin,
Capital Berlin, German Berlin--in

~he

hands of a militant German minority.

It would give an enormous and inadmissible amplification th-roughout
Germany to the present small voice of the East German minority government
at Pankow,

It would invite German nationalism throughout Germany to adhere

to the German communist standard
which freedom cannot
the need.s o:f:' ;peace

a~low.

~!?-

flyi~g

in East Berlin.

That is a handicap

It is a concession which does not accord with

Ge-rmany or the essentials of ;peaceful com;petition

bet\-reen communism and freedom.
I do not believe, Mr. President, that the way to ;peace can be
found either in the maintenance of the status quo in Berlin or in the
change which 1'1.1!'. Khrushchev proposes.
of a free

c~

A third Vlay may lie in the creation

not in West Barlin alone but in the creation of a free city

which embraces all Berlin--the comm.;.mist east no less than the free western
segment of

~hat

met:::-opolis.

peace by some international
capital of Germany.

Let this whole city be held in trust and in
autho~ity

until such time as it is again the

Let the routes of access to this whole city be gar-

risoned by in.t ernational peace teams in the effective pattern of those
now operating between Israel a-r.d the Arab States.

Let this interim status

of free city be guaranteed by the N.A.T.O. and Warsaw pa.ct cmmtries.

Let
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Bonn and Pankow

s~bscrioe

priate shares .

Let these changes be incorporated in specific written

agreements.

to this arrangement and pay its costs in appro-

Then, perhaps, we may have the beginning of a durable peace

in Berlin and the healing of the cleavage in Germany and Europe.
I

l~now,

Mr. President, that to bring about this change in Berlin

after the division of that city has hardened over many years may seem an
immensely difficult, political and diplomatic undertaking.

But is it not,

really, an infinitestimal task when compared with the full implications of
an essay in military solution with what comes after it?
I realize, too, Mr. President, that this approach may evoke no
response

from~.fr.

Khrushchev.

But Cl.oes Mr. Khrushchev's reactions, what-

ever they may be, dissolve us from our rational responsibilities to ourselves and to the world in this situation?

Do not those responsibilities

require us to explore fully and vigorously any and all avenues of peace
even as we steel ourselves for

wha~

must come if the way to peace cannot

be found?
I makes these suggestions, Mr. President, as one Senator from
the State of Montana.

I me.ke them in full recognition of the present

position of this government which, if it is unchanged, will be my personal
position when all the words are exhausted.

I make them, however, in the

belief that this present position is not enough, even as the present
Soviet position is not enough.

Our present position on Berlin, even un-

challenged by the Soviet Union, leads only in a circle endlessly repeated
as it continues to recede from the changing realities of Germany and Europe
until it now promises to become at best irrelevant and at worst a stimulus
to catastrophe.

The Soviet position on Berlin, unchanged, in my opinion,
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is also headed towards complete irrelevance unless before that point is
reached, it precipitates a military conflict by accident or design.
The implications of what I have tried to say to the Senate, then,
are clear.

Sooner or later, the Western nations and the Soviet Union must

seek a new way, a third way to solution of the Berlin problem along the
lines which 1 have suggested or some other.

Unless this search is pursued

with energy and dispatch and to fruition, sooner or later, Berlin is likely
to become the pivot of a new disaster for mankind.

